Europe has been in a financial crisis since 2007. When the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers endangered the credit of financial institutions, private
credit was replaced by the credit of the state, revealing an unrecognised flaw
in the euro.
By transferring their right to print money to the European Central
Bank (ECB), member countries exposed themselves to the risk of default.
Commercial banks loaded with weaker countries' government bonds became
potentially insolvent.
There is a parallel between the ongoing euro zone crisis and the
international banking crisis of 1982. Back then, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) saved the global banking system by lending just enough money to
heavily indebted countries; default was avoided, but at the cost of a lasting
depression.
Germany is playing the same role today as the IMF did then. The
setting differs, but the effect is the same. Creditors are shifting the entire
burden of adjustment on to the debtor countries and avoiding responsibility.
EUROPE DIVIDED
The euro zone crisis is a complex mixture of banking and
sovereign-debt problems, as well as divergences in economic performance that
have given rise to balance-of-payments imbalances within the euro zone.
The authorities did not understand the complexity of the crisis, let
alone see a solution. So they tried to buy time. Usually, that works. But not
this time, because the financial problems were combined with a process of
political disintegration.
When the European Union (EU) was created, it was the embodiment of an
open society - a voluntary association of equal states that surrendered part of
their sovereignty for the common good. The euro zone crisis is now turning the
EU into something fundamentally different, dividing member countries into two
classes - creditors and debtors - with the creditors in charge.
As the strongest creditor country, Germany has emerged as the hegemon.
Debtor countries pay substantial risk premiums for financing their government
debt.
To make matters worse, the Bundesbank remains committed to an outmoded
monetary doctrine rooted in Germany's traumatic experience with inflation. As a
result, it recognises only inflation as a threat to stability, and ignores
deflation, which is the real threat today.
There is a real danger that a two-tier Europe will become permanent.
Both human and financial resources will be attracted to the centre, leaving the
periphery permanently depressed. But the periphery is seething with discontent.
Europe's tragedy is not the result of an evil plot, but stems, rather,
from a lack of coherent policies. Germany, as the largest creditor country, is
in charge, but refuses to take on additional liabilities; as a result, every
opportunity to resolve the crisis has been missed
The crisis spread from Greece to other deficit countries, eventually
calling into question the euro's very survival. Since a break-up of the euro
would cause immense damage, Germany always does the minimum necessary to hold
it together.
Most recently, Chancellor Angela Merkel has backed ECB President Mario
Draghi, leaving Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann isolated. This will enable
the ECB to put a lid on the borrowing costs of countries that submit to an
austerity programme under the supervision of the Troika (the IMF, the ECB and
the European Commission).
That will save the euro, but it is also a step toward the permanent
division of Europe into debtors and creditors.
The debtors are bound to reject a two-tier Europe sooner or later. If
the euro breaks up in disarray, the common market and the EU will be destroyed.
The later the break-up, the worse the ultimate outcome. So it is time to
consider alternatives that until recently would have been inconceivable.
AVERT DEPRESSION
In my judgment, the best course of action is to persuade Germany to
choose between either leading the creation of a political union with genuine
burden-sharing, or leaving the euro.
Since all of the accumulated debt is denominated in euros, it makes
all the difference who remains in charge of the monetary union. If Germany
left, the euro would depreciate.
Debtor countries would regain their competitiveness; their debt would
diminish in real terms; and, with the ECB under their control, the threat of
default would disappear and their borrowing costs would fall to levels
comparable to that in the United Kingdom.
The creditor countries, by contrast, would incur losses on their
claims and investments denominated in euros and encounter stiffer competition
at home from other euro zone members. The extent of creditor countries' losses
would depend on the extent of the depreciation, giving them an interest in
keeping the depreciation within bounds.
After initial dislocations, the eventual outcome would fulfil John
Maynard Keynes' dream of an international currency system in which both
creditors and debtors share responsibility for maintaining stability. And
Europe would avert the looming depression.
The same result could be achieved, with less cost to Germany, if
Germany chose to behave as a benevolent hegemon. That would mean implementing
the proposed European banking union; establishing a more
or less level playing field between debtor and creditor countries by
establishing a Debt Reduction Fund, and eventually converting
all debt into euro bonds; and aiming at nominal GDP growth
of up to 5 per cent, so that Europe could grow its way out of excessive
indebtedness.
Whether Germany decides to lead or leave, either alternative would be
better than creating an unsustainable two-tier Europe. (source: PROJECT SYNDICATE)
by George Soros
George
Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management and of the Open Society Institute.
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